讲座一：Peer-Influenced Propensity Score Matching

讲座人介绍：

俞宁教授现任南京审计大学社会与经济研究院执行院长。他先后获得上海交通大学管理学学士、硕士、博士学位与斯坦福大学经济学硕士、博士学位；曾担任埃默里大学终身轨助理教授(Assistant Professor at Emory University)、布鲁金斯学会研究员暨清华大学清华-布鲁金斯公共政策研究中心研究主管(Fellow at Brookings Institution)、斯坦福大学Freeman Spogli国际问题研究中心研究员(Research Scholar at Stanford University)。他已在Journal of Economic Theory、Medical Care、Social Choice and Welfare、Economic Theory、Health Economics、Economics Letters、China Economic Review等11种国际期刊上有论文发表，还为18种国际期刊担任匿名审稿人。

讲座内容：

When individuals' peers exert significant influence over their treatment choice, ones need to account for the interference when using matching methods to estimate treatment effects. Accounting for peer influence in treatment choice, however, is not straightforward due to complex interactions in networks. We propose an easily implementable solution: estimating “peer-influenced propensity
scores,” and using them to match individuals and compute treatment effects. The solution is supported by a simple theory of treatment choice and outcome. As illustrations, we study the impacts of adolescent first sex and exercise participation on mental health, using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. Our method appears to balance various network characteristics between treatment and control groups well.

讲座二：Do Cross-Holdings Hinder Collusion?

讲座人介绍：秦承忠，加州大学圣巴巴拉分校（UC Santa Barbara）终身教授，南京审计大学特聘教授。为美国经济学会（AEA）,计量经济学学会（Econometric Society）,博弈论学会（Game Theory Society）等经济学组织的会员。曾在美国斯坦福大学、比利时运筹与计量经济学研究中心、香港科技大学、香港城市大学，山东大学，德国University of Bielefeld等大学和研究机构从事学术研究。担任《Economic Theory》，《Economic Theory Bulletin》，《Pacific Economic Review》，《Frontiers of Economics in China》经济学期刊的编委。主要研究领域为博弈论、激励理论、机制设计、一般均衡理论及其在产业经济学、金融经济学、国际经济学中应用的研究。

讲座内容：

Cross-holding refers to a situation in which a firm acquires passive ownership in another firm that entitles the acquiring firm a share in the acquired firm's profit but not in decision making. Cross-holdings are commonly observed in the real world. A major issue with cross-holdings is whether they facilitate collusion. It is well known that firms tend to be more collusive in static oligopolies. For repeated oligopolies, however, behavioral implications of cross-holdings depend on their impacts on both the incentive to defect from tacit collusive agreements and punishment that would follow after defection has taken place. We analyze repeated oligopolistic competition with product differentiation and cross-holdings. For a class of cross-holdings based on empirical observation, we show that although cross-holdings weaken the incentive to defect, they soften the punishment to a greater extent, so that cross-holdings hinder instead of facilitating tacit collusion. We discuss sensitivities of the anti-collusive effect of cross-holdings with respect to product differentiation.

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