【时空经济沙龙第70期】Peer-Influenced Propensity Score Matching；
Do Cross-Holdings Hinder Collusion?
When individuals’ peers exert significant influence over their treatment choice, ones need to account for the interference when using matching methods to estimate treatment effects. Accounting for peer influence in treatment choice, however, is not straightforward due to complex interactions in networks. We propose an easily implementable solution and using them to match individuals and compute treatment effects.
A major issue with cross-holdings is whether they facilitate collusion. It is well known that firms tend to be more collusive in static oligopolies. For repeated oligopolies, however, behavioral implications of cross-holdings depend on their impacts on both the incentive to defect from tacit collusive agreements and punishment that would follow after defection has taken place. We analyze repeated oligopolistic competition with product differentiation and cross-holdings.
俞宁教授现任南京审计大学社会与经济研究院执行院长。他先后获得上海交通大学管理学学士、硕士、博士学位与斯坦福大学经济学硕士、博士学位；曾担任埃默里大学终身轨助理教授、布鲁金斯学会研究员暨清华大学清华-布鲁金斯公共政策研究中心研究主管(Fellow at Brookings Institution)、斯坦福大学Freeman Spogli国际问题研究中心研究员(Research Scholar at Stanford University)。他已在Journal of Economic Theory、Medical Care、Social Choice and Welfare、Economic Theory、Health Economics、Economics Letters、China Economic Review等11种国际期刊上有论文发表，还为18种国际期刊担任匿名审稿人。