讲座人介绍：
Pradeep Dubey，计量经济学会会士（fellow of The Econometric Society），纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系首席教授（leading professor）及该校博弈论研究中心联合主任（codirector）。纽约州立大学石溪分校博弈论研究中心是国际上博弈论研究最重要的几个中心之一，其每年组织的会议是博弈论领域最重要的年会。Dubey教授主要研究兴趣是博弈论和数理经济学，是国际顶尖的博弈论专家。Dubey教授在博弈论领域做出了卓越贡献，有很多重要论文发表在Econometrica、Quarterly Journal of Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Mathematics of Operations Research以及Games and Economic Behavior 等顶级期刊。Dubey教授目前还是国际博弈论学会理事会成员（council member of Game Theory Society）。
讲座内容：
We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of all facilities amongst the players in an equitable manner. The equitable solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus serves as an alternative justi cation of the value. We show that this approach extends also to the case when not all coalitions can form, provided those that can constitute a semi-algebra of sets (i.e., contain the grand coalition, and are closed under complements).
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2019/12/05
10:37
