时间：2025年6月6日（周五）上午 10:30-12:00
地点：思源东楼821  
报告人简介：郑捷，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；山东省“泰山学者计划”特聘专家，入选国家重大人才工程；山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）主任。清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编，担任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题连续获“特优”评价）。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等期刊。担任中国信息经济学会常务理事、中国运筹学会博弈论分会常务理事、中国行为与实验经济学论坛联合秘书长、中国微观经济理论论坛学术委员会委员、中国经济学年会微观理论与行为经济专业委员会委员等学术职务。
报告摘要：The third price discrimination typically refers to firms’ pricing strategies in which the prices received by consumers are positively related to their willingness to pay. We show in this paper that when there is capacity limit and demand uncertainty, a reverse price discrimination can occur as a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy. In our benchmark setup, a monopoly seller provides one type of products to two buyers, whose willingness to pay for the product differs. We assume that the monopoly seller can perfectly conduct price discrimination on the two buyers, and there is a capacity limit regarding how many units of products the seller can provide per day. In addition, the demand uncertainty is introduced into the model such that the buyers’ likelihood to consume has a linear functional form that depends on the price they each receive. We identify the condition under which in equilibrium there is reverse price discrimination. We also extend the current model to the multiple consumers case and the more general demand function case. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the implementation of price discrimination.