主讲人介绍：

徐进，男，山东大学数学学院副研究员。研究方向：博弈论、网络经济学、优化理论。

内容刚要：

We study a contest game among players fighting in a nexus of conflicts. Each  player confronts different competitors in heterogeneous battlefields, and decides how  much effort to exert in order to maximize the expected value of winning prizes net the cost of efforts. We show that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria is nonempty and convex, and provide equivalent characterizations using techniques from Variational Inequality (VI). We illustrate that strong monotonicity of cost functions always implies uniqueness of equilibrium regardless of the structure of conflict. Using VI approach, we conduct extensive comparative statics analysis with respect to the parameters of the model on equilibrium efforts and payoffs, and discuss several applications in terms of
prize allocation and contest design. Finally， we provide examples which capture economic insights.

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