主讲人介绍：

By a technical tool of a strategy hyperplane, we prove that the continuous-time best-response dynamic from a generic initial point converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in exponential rate in almost all potential games. We then consider the best-response dynamic defined in a consideration-set game, where players face random strategy constraints when playing the underlying game. In the case that the underlying game is a two-player identical payoff game with cheap talk, we show that if one player is under a strategy constraint slightly biased towards the efficient outcome, then the best-response dynamic from a generic initial point must converge to the efficient outcome, regardless of the constraint for the other player.

内容刚要：

本次报告将从城市追求的政策目标出发，思考为实现这些目标可能采取的策略。基于此，本次报告将概述可用的政策措施的范围，并讨论如何将它们进行组合能够使政策变得更有效、更容易被接受。

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