【素质拓展】Voluntary Separation as a Disciplinary Device for Long-Term Cooperation: Reconciling Theory with Evidence

2018年12月17日 16:00 ~ 2018年12月17日 18:00

北京海淀区SD821

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黄美晨

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报名截止时间:2018-12-14 16:00
取消预约时间:2018-12-14 15:30
讲座人:杨春雷
承办方:经管学院
适用人群:学硕研究生 博士研究生 
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主讲人介绍:

杨春雷教授,著名实验与行为经济学家,德国多特蒙德大学经济学博士,教育部长江学者特聘教授,从2016年起担任南京审计大学教授。主要研究微观经济学、博弈论、实验与行为经济学,在PNAS, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, European Economic Review等国际权威学术期刊发表论文20余篇。


内容纲要:

We provide an evidence-based theory to explain how partners forge a

cooperative relationship when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the match. We utilize laboratory methods to gather insights on the evolution of cooperation in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are at odds with out-for-tat (OFT) which, based on the VSRPD literature, is a disciplinary device that helps facilitate mutual cooperation in the long run. Our Pro-Partnership Proposition is formulated to accommodate the observation that human subjects often favor a more forgiving stay-but-act-like-a-stranger move instead of OFT to punish norm violators. A new class of equilibria,

called the CoDe-indi_erent equilibria, is introduced to address the within-match rewards and punishments found in the data.


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