时间：2025年6月6日（周五）上午 9:00-10:30
地点：思源东楼821   
报告人简介：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（连暐虹），山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；山东大学特聘教授、国家自然科学基金委外籍优青；山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）联席主任。美国卫尔斯利女子学院学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士。担任North American Journal of Economics and Finance等多份国际学术期刊客座编辑与编委成员。研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。曾获"中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖"、"中国信息经济学2018青年创新奖"和"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"。
报告摘要：How to promote cooperation in social dilemmas is both academically challenging and practically important. We introduce a voluntary commitment mechanism for public goods provision which is highly effective in the laboratory, and can be considered for implementation in problems such as climate agreements. We study a 2x2 design of treatments varying by whether players have to commit to or merely declare their contributions (declare vs. commit), and whether the declaration/commitment is at the individual or group level (individual vs. group). We find that declarations alone are ineffective, and that there is no relationshipbetween individuals’ declarations and contributions, resulting in poor outcomes. In the Individual Commitment treatment, while subjects adhere to their commitments, the overall commitment level is low. In all of these treatments, payoffs are decreasing in contributions made, and a substantial static norm of zero contributions develops. Only the Group Commitment treatment succeeds in achieving an increasing pattern of commitment and contributions, and converges rapidly to a predominant norm of full contributions.